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Abstract 
This study contributes to the dollarization literature by expanding its determinants to account 
for different dimensions of globalization, using the widely employed KOF index of 
globalization. Specifically, globalization is “unbundled” into three different layers namely: 
economic, social and political dimensions. The study focuses on 25 sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) countries for the period 2001-2012.Using the Tobit regression approach, the following 
findings are established. First, from both economic and statistical relevance, the social and 
political dimensions of globalization constitute the key dollarization amplifiers, while the 
explanatory power of the economic component is weaker on dollarization. Second, consistent 
with the theoretical underpinnings, macroeconomic instabilities (such as inflation and 
exchange rate volatilities) have the positive expected signs. Third, the positive association 
between the accumulation of international reserves and dollarization is also apparent. Policy 
implications are discussed.  
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1.0 Introduction 
The issue centering on financial dollarization (FD)2 has dominated and still continues to 
dominate discussion spaces, mostly among policymakers, researchers as well as other 
stakeholders. This is particularly so because the phenomenon has assumed a threatening 
dimension to the financial-cum-monetary sovereignty of most emerging and transitional 
economies. The concern is considered imperative given the fact that some countries within 
the African continent, particularly those in the sub-Saharan African (SSA)3 region have been 
perpetually enmeshed in the web of ‘flight to quality’4 syndrome with the aim of hedging 
against continuous fall in the value of their domestic against foreign currencies. In fact, the 
wield phenomenon has engulfed the region to the extent that it has trailed after other regions 
like Latin America 5  and East Asia and the Pacific, where large amounts of financial 
transactions have been denominated in foreign currencies. The foreseeable implications 6 
thereon have come under close scrutiny thus, warranting researchers to seek answers to 
questions like: what constitutes the key drivers of FD? Why are some countries, regions and 
continents experiencing more FD than others? What constitutes the way out of the economic 
quagmire? Unarguably, a large chunk of researches has been investigating important aspects 
and practical details of the subject in the literature. Broadly speaking, in a recent survey, De 
Nicolo et al. (2003) and Levy-Yeyati (2006) have summarized the main drivers of FD 
captured by the deposit dollarization measure to include: past rate of inflation which aligns 
with the currency substitution view (e.g., Savastano 1996; Sahay and Vegh 1996), the 
minimum variance portfolio (MVP) dollarization share which expresses unalloyed support 
for a portfolio argument standpoint (e.g., Ize and Levy-Yeyati 2003), a financial development 
view (Honohan and Shi, 2002; De Nicolo et al. 2003; and Asel, 2010), the quality of 
institutions and exchange rate pegs also neatly fitting into the institutional perspective (e.g., 
De Nicolo et al. 2003; Rennhack and Nozaki 2006). While many of these factors have been 
                                            
2Dollarization and financial dollarization (FD) are used interchangeably in this paper. 
3Dollarization has remained significant and persistent at 30 percent rates for both bank loans and deposits in 
SSA though found not to have increased significantly since 2001. However its reduction still lags behind those 
of other regions (Corrales et al. 2016; Raheem and Asongu, 2018) 
4
 It is a phenomenon that is concerned with the action of investors moving their capital away from riskier 
investments to the safest investment vehicles. This is usually created by uncertainty in the financial or 
international markets. Examples include countries like Ecuador and El-Salvador which have abandoned their 
national currencies for the American dollar. 
5
 Belonging to this category are such countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Peru and Uruguay. These countries are 
being referred to as highly dollarized economies since their ratios of foreign currency deposits to broad money 
are in excess of 50 percent.  
6
 For instance, it has been alleged as capable of constituting a potential source of balance of payment and 
financial crises in the face of large exchange rate fluctuations as well as posing a serious threat to both 
macroeconomic and financial stability. 
4 
 
well documented in the literature, what is still less clear and probably under-researched is that 
aspect which borders on FD main transmission channels7.  
Arguably, globalization is one of the formidable candidates capable of transmitting 
the FD phenomenon since it involves cross-border movements of goods and services which 
are financial and non-financial. The heightened concern however, hinges on its various 
dimensions of impacts, which have been classified to include economic, political and social8 
dimensions (Dreher, 2006; Asongu et al., 2018). Notably, of the dimensions, economic 
globalization has often times, been considered as being synonymous to the real concept of 
globalization thus making other dimensional impacts to be inadvertently underrated. Just like 
economic globalization, the need to bother on other dimensions is of immense concern as 
they equally entail movements of foreign currencies from one country, region or continent to 
another. For instance, the social dimension aspect of globalization, characterized by the 
spread of ideas, information and images, has been found to cause substantial movements in 
foreign currencies. A case in point can be related to include the activities of the entertainment 
industry, which have   gained widespread acceptance among many African countries. The 
elite and government official in high positions of authority are usually seen engaging in 
clandestine multi-million deals with their host foreign counterparts. The underlying 
transactions are, more often than not, involving substantial currency transfers. This aside, the 
prevalence of internet services and other allied information and communication activities are 
reckoned areas worthy of mentioning.  Further, the political dimension of globalization 
(which habours activities like diffusion of government policies involving embassies, high 
commissions and other foreign missions) often deal in foreign currencies, thus suggesting 
that it is never completely immune to FD syndrome. Viewing from these focal lenses, the 
study’s concern therefore is to explore primarily, the impactful roles of various dimensions of 
globalization on dollarization. This research exercise is considered important as conjectures 
devoid of formal empirical authentication seem to be baseless or at best unfounded.  
In light of the foregoing, the study unravels the supposed relationship between the 
unbundled globalization indices and FD for developing countries like those in the SSA region 
for the following reasons: (i) The most notable has been compactly captured under 
                                            
7With the exception of few studies (like Moreno-Villalaz, 2005; Arellano and Heathcote, 2010; Kessy, 2011; 
Brown et al.,2015; Raheem and Asongu, 2018; Asongu et al., 2018) that have concentrated on examining the 
impact of financial integration on dollarization under different geographical contexts. 
8
 Economic globalization has been characterized as long-distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as 
information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges; political globalization is characterized by a 
diffusion of government policies; and social globalization has been expressed as the spread of ideas, information, 
images and people. 
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“(un)blessed trinity” argument in the literature. This term has been enunciated as constituting 
those economies that are characterized by three sterling qualities namely: (weak) strong 
international currency, (in) flexible exchange rate regime, and (poor) sound contractual and 
regulatory environment. While the developed countries undoubtedly are characterized by 
good quality features at one end, the other categories, which are duly represented by ill-
quality features, are typical of countries within the developing African region at the other end. 
This notwithstanding, other auxiliary reasons that are considered germane include: (ii) 
widespread of globalization waves across countries in the region; the average level of loan 
dollarization is found to be modestly increased for SSA while the same remains stable or 
falling in other regions like Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia and Pacific as well as 
Europe and Central Asia. For instance, in 2001, 26 percent of total bank credit in the region 
(which later shot-up to 34 percent in 2012) was denominated in foreign currencies. Moreover, 
the region has also been found to have lagged behind other regions in the de-dollarization9 
phenomenon; (iii)The symptomatic feature of macroeconomic volatility typical of all known 
dollarized economies is also a common feature in SSA (Corrales et al., 2016), among other 
factors. 
Against this background, the study’s contributions are pinned down on providing 
fresh evidence on the stock of FD literature but paying a particular attention to the strand that 
specifically features globalization and its various dimensions in the globalization-
dollarization nexus. Moreover, the study probes into causal linkages between the duo using 
an instrumental estimation strategy that has some bite on endogeneity because it accounts for 
simultaneity issues. 
 The rest of the study is structured as follows.  Section 2 covers some stylized 
background information on globalization and dollarization. The review of the literature is 
undertaken in Section 3 by delving into both the theoretical and empirical issues. Section 4 
presents the methodology, model specification as well as data issues. Specifically, this section 
first justifies the use of Tobit regression before delving into the reason for the adoption of 25 
SSA countries. The empirical results emanating from the estimated model are presented in 
Section 5, in which three main results are established: (i) validation of the minimum variance 
portfolio theory; (ii) social and political dimensions of globalization are found to be positive 
and significant determinants of dollarization, while(iii) the economic component of 
                                            
9
 The deposits in foreign currency in Latin America and the Caribbean region stood at 36.3% in 2003 and later 
fell to 25.6% in 2012. A similar story can be told of East Asia and Pacific whose deposits dollarization dropped 
to 17 % in 2012 from 25% in 2003. Europe and Central Asia also managed to reduce same by 10 percentage 
points between 2001 and 2012 (Corrales et al., 2016). 
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globalization is established to reflect a weak explanatory power. Concluding implications and 
future research directions are provided in Section 6. 
 
2.0 Some salient stylized Information  
Table 1 below depicts the extent as well as the magnitude of dimensions of globalization 
impacts across countries within the SSA region. Generally speaking, a cursory visual 
inspection of the table points to the fact that the region is faring poorly in the globalization 
index. This notwithstanding, a country-by-country analysis rates Angola and Mauritius (with 
the scales of 68.47 and 68.25 respectively), as leaders  in relation to economic globalization. 
Burundi is found operating lowest in the ladder. On the scorecard of social globalization, 
Mauritius and Seychelles having scales ranging between 63.65 and 55.13 appear to be 
topping the chart, with the Democratic Republic  of Congo (DRC) and Angola lying on the 
lower bound, particularly within the precincts of 13.94 and 18.47, respectively. On the 
political front of globalization, Nigeria, South Africa and Ghana seem to be spearheading the 
race with scales ranging in the order of 89.12, 84.18 and 83.98 while the positions of Sao 
Tome & Principe and Eritrea are found ebbing away with the value ranges of 29.75 and 29.05. 
Taking together, the scorecard finally rates Mauritius (60.75) and Namibia (56.06) as 
the first and second runners-up while South Africa with the scale of 65.76 assumes the lead 
position, at least for the region.  
Regionally speaking, in Table 2, Southern Africa appears to be the most globalized 
African region except in the political sphere where North Africa takes the lead position. The 
Central African region remains a laggard in all dimensions of globalization with the 
exception of economic spheres where it overruns both the East and West African regions by 
percentage points of 0.99 and 1.85 respectively. Comparing each regional average with the 
African average, the Southern African (East African) region stands as the best (worst) 
performer. It is also worth noting that the average of SSA is marginally lower than the 
African average. 
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Table 1:   Average of Globalization Dimensions in Sub-Saharan Africa Region (2001-12) 
Countries Economic 
Globalization 
Social 
Globalization 
Political 
Globalization 
Average of the 
Aggregate 
Angola 68.47 18.47 46.09 44.34 
Botswana 64.01 40.22 44.96 49.73 
Burundi 25.08 19.86 47.20 30.71 
Cape Verde 52.17 38.36 36.26 42.26 
Comoros - 27.08 31.47 29.28 
DRC 37.33 13.94 53.95 35.07 
Djibouti - 36.79 57.48 47.13 
Eritrea - 21.91 29.05 25.48 
Ghana 48.89 32.25 83.98 55.04 
Guinea 36.30 23.49 72.91 44.23 
Kenya 38.79 27.64 82.70 49.71 
Liberia - 21.41 43.92 32.66 
Malawi 42.29 26.90 58.81 42.67 
Mauritius 68.25 63.65 50.35 60.75 
Mozambique 53.46 27.61 63.74 48.27 
Namibia 62.69 42.67 62.83 56.06 
Nigeria 55.54 22.27 89.12 55.65 
Rwanda 32.23 24.06 56.32 37.54 
Sao Tome& 
Principe  
- 33.96 29.75 31.85 
Seychelles - 55.13 35.36 45.25 
Sierra Leone 39.75 19.40 56.32 38.49 
South Africa 66.14 46.95 84.18 65.76 
Tanzania 41.39 19.64 56.41 39.14 
Uganda 46.70 22.96 64.34 44.67 
Zambia 59.49 28.95 74.74 54.40 
DRC: the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Source: Authors’ computation from KOF index 
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Table:  2             Average Globalization Indices for Africa Regions (2001-12) 
Africa Regions Economic 
Globalization 
Social 
Globalization 
Political 
Globalization 
Overall 
Globalization 
Index 
Central Africa (CA) 45.59 23.37 48.74 36.78 
East Africa (EA) 44.60 25.54 55.04 40.15 
West Africa (WA) 43.74 26.29 65.35 42.80 
North Africa(NA) 46.71 37.92 75.21 51.22 
Southern Africa (SA) 63.82 39.81 52.96 51.90 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 46.18 26.97 58.14 41.97 
Total Average  
(All African countries) 
47.09 28.91 59.17 43.16 
Source: Authors’ computation from KOF index 
 
Financial dollarization has been found to wax stronger in virtually all economies of 
the world.  Of the countries however, the SSA region appears to dominate both in terms of 
deposit and loan dollarization. The Table 3 below presents the global trends of financial 
dollarization. 
 
Table 3: Global Trends of Financial Globalization 
Regions Deposit Dollarization Loan Dollarization 
SSA 29.6 30.5 
Latin America and Caribbean 28.2 25.1 
East & South Africa and 
Pacific 
19.5 18.95 
Middle East and North Africa 15.6 12.3 
Average 29.1 27.0 
SSA: sub-Saharan Africa. 
Source: Raheem and Asongu (2018).  
 
From the table, the dollarization indices rank SSA as the most dollarized, with loan 
dollarization surpassing the threshold value of 3010. This is not surprising because the region 
is capitally-deficient. Hence it resorts to external financing as means of sustaining growth and 
development. It has been documented that the region is fundamentally financed through 
foreign currency (Raheem and Asongu, 2018). Also, the Latin America and Caribbean region 
assumes the second position in terms of the two measures of FD. This is particularly so 
because some countries within the region like Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, El-Salvador, Ecuador 
and Peru have given-up their national currencies for US dollars. 
Further, financial dollarization has been found to be more prevalent among the three 
                                            
10
 A country is said to be highly dollarized if the ratio of the measure of FD exceeds 30% (see Balino, Bennett a
nd Boreinztein, 1999; Corrales et al. 2016 for further details). 
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countries in SSA, namely: Angola, the DRC and Liberia. Apart from these three countries, 
others like Djibouti, Ghana, Mozambique, Sao Tome & Principe, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and 
Zambia can equally be referred to as highly dollarized nations if the 30% threshold is 
anything to go by. It is equally worth mentioning that majority of the countries within the 
region can be regarded as low dollarization countries. These include: Cape Verde, Comoros, 
Namibia and South Africa whose values of FD are in single digit over the period of review. 
Table 4 presents dollarization episodes of the selected SSA countries. 
 
Table 4:                      Financial Dollarization in Sub-Saharan Africa Region 
Countries 2001-04 2005-08 2009-12 2001-12 
Angola 76.67 66 55.5 66.06 
Botswana 23.15 17.14 25.92 22.07 
Burundi 7.5 12.63 14.56 11.56 
Cape verde 6.2 6.74 6.43 6.46 
Comoros 2.23 1.00 1.00 1.41 
DRC 80.23 84.73 85.27 83.41 
Djibouti 58.45 54.73 57.13 56.77 
Eritrea 18.38 18.98 15.99 17.78 
Ghana 30.58 29.26 28.5 29.45 
Guinea 25.17 30.22 21.45 25.61 
Kenya 15.87 15.03 16.24 15.71 
Liberia 76.8 83.03 82.6 80.81 
Malawi 19.52 17.88 16.52 17.97 
Mauritius 14.98 19.92 15.34 16.75 
Mozambique 49.5 42.25 34.75 42.17 
Namibia 1.73 1.21 0.84 1.26 
Nigeria 8.94 10.32 13.83 11.03 
Rwanda 30.01 24.03 22.13 25.39 
Sao Tome & 
Principe 
48.66 60.42 56.5 55.19 
Seychelles 4.34 15.73 27.76 15.94 
Sierra Leone 27.35 30.01 34.87 30.74 
South Africa 1.45 1.25 1.00 1.23 
Tanzania 40.5 38.25 34.51 37.75 
Uganda 30.87 26.18 26.45 27.83 
Zambia 49.37 41.26 38.25 42.96 
DRC: the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Source: Raheem and Asongu (2018). 
 
In light of the aforementioned developments, a pertinent question remains: how does 
the degree of globalization affect dollarization? Quite interestingly, some insightful pictures 
can be discerned from the duo relationships as depicted in Tables 1 and 4.First, for the highly 
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dollarized nations like Angola, globalization is seen to favour the economic sphere more than 
the other two dimensions (like social and political) while the DRC and Liberia are seen to be 
operating at higher levels of political spheres. Second, the least dollarized nations do not 
seem to herald less globalization as Cape Verde enjoys more economic globalization, and 
same argument is seen to hold for Namibia and South Africa. Lastly, a direct relationship 
seems to be entrenched for Comoros whose dollarization regimes are (un)coincidentally in 
tandem with globalization episodes. It is therefore apparent that visual observations alone 
may not offer objective evaluations without making recourse to empirical estimates.  
 
3.0 Literature Review 
This section aims at x-raying both the theoretical arguments underpinning FD on the one 
hand and on the other hand, the empirical verifications of these underlined FD theories and 
corresponding channels of transmission. Thus, achieving the twin objectives are pursued in 
what follows. 
The concept of dollarization largely connotes the use of foreign as against domestic 
currencies in socio-economic and political transactions. Its development has been attributed 
to two major phenomena in the literature namely: currency and asset substitution arguments. 
The former has been argued as occasioning FD owing to the prevalence of problems 
emanating from both inflation and exchange rates. To the extent that the FD reigns, the 
effectiveness of monetary policy is presumptively believed to be rendered impotent. These 
situations seem to be so as perceived risks of changes in the value of the domestic currency 
are greater where floating exchange rates predominate (Miles, 1978; Arturo and Schadler 
1980; Girton and Roper, 1981; Ortiz, 1983). This notwithstanding, the decline in the rates of 
inflation in the 1990s amid high dollarized episodes, has stirred torrent of attacks bordering 
on the underlying causes of currency view from the critics. The ensued attacks have later 
hatched the emergence of the latter group (asset substitution view) challenging the initial 
status quo. For instance, Edwards and Magendzo (2003) submitted that inflation has been 
significantly lower in dollarized countries than in their non-dollarized counterparts. By and 
large, this latter argument has been analyzed from four main perspectives in the literature, 
which include: portfolio, market development, financial development and institutional views. 
The portfolio argument to dollarization has been viewed mainly from the standpoint 
of optimal portfolio choice. Accordingly, it is viewed in the sense that if domestic deposit 
yields higher returns than a corresponding dollar deposit, deposit dollarization should be 
lower and vice versa. Market development also sees dollarization as the sub-optimal response 
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to market imperfections. The financial development strand argued that the misallocation 
effects of the financial institutions has an important effect on the dollarization process while 
the institutional view conceives dollarization phenomenon as emanating from both 
institutional and policy failures. The need to hedge against it, could amplify the use of more 
foreign as against domestic currencies. 
It is also worthy of note that, while a burgeoning literature exists on the empirical 
studies on FD, the focus has specifically aimed at either validating or refuting the above 
claims.  Several macroeconomic variables have been identified as drivers of FD as earlier 
espoused in the theoretical literature. Topping the list are inflation and exchange rates. The 
twin variables have been charged as being the primary drivers of the FD phenomenon and 
these have consequently been confirmed for several countries and regions (Bahmani-Oskooee 
and Techaratanachai,2001; Arteta, 2002; Ize and Levy-Yeyati, 2003 and 2005; Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger, 2005; Kaplan et al.,2008). In spite of the empirical regularity between each 
of these variables and FD, contrary results have been established by another strand of authors 
(like Honig 2009 and Berkmen and Cavallo, 2010) thus, invalidating a direct connection 
between exchange rate regimes and FD. 
Apart from the core variables for which the debates about currency view were initially 
generated, some other variables like real interest rate differentials have equally been alleged 
as probable culpable. Researchers like Sahay and Vegh (1996), Savastano (1996), Basso et al. 
(2011) and Kessy (2011) have established a positive influence of interest rate differentials on 
financial dollarization. Just like with the case of inflation and exchange rates, some 
researchers’ conclusions also had somewhat conflicting postures. For instance, Arteta (2002) 
confirmed the explanatory power of interest rate spread to be poor in driving FD. Further, 
some additional variables were extolled as playing a prominent role in FD promotion. More 
importantly, institutional factors and credibility policy stance were stressed. The examples of 
studies in this category include: Calvo and Guidotti (1989); Savastano (1992); Ize and 
Parrado (2002); Jeanne (2003); Levy-Yeyati (2006); Honig (2009) and Neanidis and Savva 
(2013). Other than the foregoing variables, the importance of financial sector indicators was 
equally accorded greater weights. Studies like Honohan and Shi (2002); De Nicolo et al. 
(2003) and Asel (2010) and Corrales et al. (2016) also submitted the existence of the 
impactful and positive roles of financial variables on FD in the countries, regions or 
continents of case studies. 
Similar in spirits to the present enquiry are studies like Moreno-Villalaz (2005), 
Arellano and Heathcote (2010), Kessy (2011), Brown et al. (2015), and Raheem and Asongu 
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(2018) who have examined causal linkages between dollarization and integration using 
different study areas and analytical tools.   
To begin with, Arellano and Heathcote (2010) specifically analyzed the interaction 
between the choice of exchange rate regime and integration into international financial 
markets. In providing solutions to this salient issue, they built a small open economy model, 
in which they argued that dollarization, perhaps attractive as monetary instrument elimination 
could help strengthen incentives to repay debts, thereby increasing access to international 
credit. Thus, when the model was applied to El-Salvadorian data, it was predicted that 
eliminating the monetary instrument could allow the country to borrow more while the 
converse was held for a comparator country like Mexico. Given the similar character of 
Arellano and Heathcote (2010) with Moreno-Villalaz’s (2005), attempt was made to 
differentiate them on the following grounds: (i) the latter was conducted on Panama, and (ii) 
unlike other highly dollarized economies, Panama has effective institutional structures that 
enabled her market to function properly and as such help enhanced macroeconomic efficiency.  
Brown et al. (2015) examined the relationship between the perceived stability of the 
domestic currency and FD using variation in the quarterly series on consumer price inflation, 
across 71 Russian regions, over the period Q2 2005 to Q2 2014. They were able to establish 
that a one standard deviation increase in regional year-on-year inflation was associated with 
0.10 standard deviation increase in deposit dollarization in the next quarter and a 0.11 
standard deviation decrease in the dollarization of loans to non-tradable firms. In addition, the 
impact of inflation on credit dollarization appeared to be weaker in regions where the banking 
sector was less integrated. 
Kessy (2011) conducted a study on the dollarization process in Tanzania. The study 
further provided a comparative analysis of dollarization between Tanzania and other East 
African countries. Among the explanatory variables in the model was gross capital inflow, 
which could be argued to be classified as economic globalization. The proxies for capital 
inflows are foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign aid. The importance of these 
variables amplifying the level of dollarization cannot be questioned. Raheem and Asongu 
(2018) made a rebuttal to the claim of Kessy (2011) by arguing that the study ignored the 
important role of remittances in the developing countries. As such, they provided a better 
proxy for capital inflows by relying on a more encompassing data. Specifically, financial 
integration dataset provided by Lanes and Milessi-Ferrati (2006) was used. Their results 
show that financial integration is a positive determinant of dollarization in the selected 
countries. 
13 
 
Given the brief empirical survey on the main drivers of dollarization in the previous 
literature, it is therefore apparent that a missing gap remains the socio-economic-political 
environment upon which the entire activities are transacted, perhaps inadvertently 
undermined or at best, yet to be given due consideration. Thus, filling this void remains the 
primary goal of the present enquiry. Plainly, the study contributes to the stock of knowledge 
at least in one major respect: unlike the tri-referenced studies which focus on one aspect of 
globalization, viz economic, our study makes a clear distinction by focusing on the three 
components of globalization as well as the aggregate index. 
 
 
4.0 Methodology, Model Specification and Data 
At the end of this section, there would be a clear understanding of two fundamental aspects 
that are considered to be germane in studying the relationship between dollarization and 
elements of globalization. The first issue relates to methodology, while the second item 
concerns model specification, data sources and measurements. 
 
4.1 Methodology 
Due to the construction of the two main variables of interest (i.e. dollarization and 
globalization), in this study we are constrained to use a methodology that is considered to be 
best suited for this type of data11. Hence, the censored nature of the data invalidates the use of 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates. As such, Tobin (1958) designed a methodology that 
works with censored variables and coined it “Tobit regression”. In simple terms, the model 
entails the simultaneous use of maximum likelihood estimation and probit model.  
The standard Tobit model (Tobin, 1958; Carsun and Sun, 2007; Asongu and le Roux, 
2017; Boateng  et al., 2018) is as follows: 
tititi Xy ,,0
*
,
 
 ,                                                 (1) 
where *
,tiy is a latent response variable, tiX , is an observed k1 vector of explanatory variables 
and ti, i.i.d. N(0, σ2) and is independent variable  of tiX , . Instead of observing *,tiy , we 
observe tiy , :   
                                            
11
 Dollarization and globalization are constructed in such a way that there is an upper limit bound. In essence, 
there is a threshold of 100%, which cannot be exceeded. In the case of dollarization any country with 
dollarization index of 100% is considered to be fully dollarized. Classical common examples in the literature are 
Ecuador, El-Salvador and Panama, to name a few. The same logic applies to globalization. Accordingly, both 
dollarization and globalization indices are considered to be censored variables. 
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where is a non stochastic constant. In other words, the value of *
,tiy is missing when it is less 
than or equal to   . 
Endogeneity is a statistical problem that if not accounted for could lead to conjured 
results and hence the formulation of wrong policies. The main causes of endogeneity are 
reverse causality, measurement error and omitted variable bias. Of these three causes, there 
are high chances that the model would suffer from reverse causality and measurement error. 
In order to correct for the simultaneity dimension of endogeneity, the study adopted a Tobit 
Instrumental variable regression12.  
 
4.2        Model Specification 
Compared to other topics in international macroeconomics, dollarization is a relatively new 
concept, which has triggered a renewed interest in the last decade of the nineteenth century13. 
As argued earlier, there are very few studies that are related to ours. Hence, we follow the 
models of these studies (Kessy, 2011; Raheem and Asongu, 2018). However, these models 
are modified to account for the inclusion of globalization indices. Thus, the equation to be 
estimated is presented in what follows: 
 ܨܦ�� =∝  + ܴܧܷܴܶ �ܰ� + ܩ�ܱܤܣ��� +  ܥܱܴܱܰܶ� �ܵ� + �� + �� + ���, (3) 
 
where, FD is a proxy for dollarization (foreign currency deposit as a ratio of broad money 
supply). RETURN is a vector that captures differences between the rate of returns of both 
domestic and foreign currencies. Essentially, this vector variable includes interest rate 
differentials between domestic and foreign currencies (INT), exchange rate volatility (SEXR), 
inflation (INF), and exchange rate depreciation (EXDEP). GLOBAL is the globalization 
indices, which are decomposed into economic, political and social dimensions14. We also use 
                                            
12The literature offers two types of instruments: internal and external. Due to the complexity of finding external 
instruments, we decided to use the former, which entails the use of lagged differences and lagged levels of the 
explanatory variables. 
13
 It does not mean this issue has not existed before. Running down the memory lane, it can be argued that 
dollarization is as aged as World Wars I and II. Following the abandonment of gold standard and the Bretton 
Woods system as fallout of the outbreak of World Wars I and II respectively, some countries have sought for 
exchange rate regimes to enhance their economic stability and growth. Among the exchange rate regimes being 
sought for is “currency substitution” otherwise known as dollarization, currency board, among others. 
14KOF index perceives globalization in three dimensions: economic, political and social. These dimensions 
where further aggregated using principal component analysis. More information on this index could be sourced 
15 
 
the aggregated index of these three indices which is obtained using principal component 
analysis. CONTROLS variables in this study are institutions (INST)15, financial development 
(FIN) and GDP per capita growth (GDP), international reserves (RES),�and � capture time 
and country-specific effects, respectively.���is the independently and identically distributed 
(iid) error term component, while i and t are country and time dimensions, respectively. 
 
A dataset for 25 SSA countries for the period 2001 and 2012 was built. These countries and 
time frame were selected strictly based on data availability. Our main data sources are the 
World Development Indicators, International Financial Statistics of the IMF and the KOF 
index of globalization. The appendix contains list of countries under investigations, data 
description, measurement and sources of variables. 
 
5.0 Empirical Results 
The descriptive statistics of the model is presented in Table 5 below. It is estimated that the 
average ratio of dollarization in the selected countries is about 30%, which is the threshold 
level of a dollarized economy. In terms of variability, it could be said that the variable is fairly 
stable. This satisfies the argument of a strand in the literature about the persistent nature of 
dollarization. The decomposition of the globalization shows that the political component has 
the highest mean value of 56.588, which is followed by the economic and social components. 
These indices are quite stable judging by the values of standard deviations. The exchange rate 
related variables are understandably the most volatile series in the model. On the average, the 
region has an inflationary rate of about 12%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
from https://www.kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html 
15The World Governance Indicators of Kauffmann et al. (1999) consist of six indices of governance, which are: 
control of corruption, rule of law, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and 
political stability. There is a very minimal variation among these indices just as they are highly correlated. 
(Ajide and Raheem, 2016a, 2016b; Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016a, 2016b). Hence, we solved these problems 
through the use of principal component analysis in order to aggregate these indices. 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics 
Categories Variables Mean  StdDev Min  Max 
Dependent Var DOL 29.606 23.439 1 90 
RETURNS INF 12.204 24.510 -2.404 359.936 
EXDEP 72.202 281.2884 -950.998 2290.15 
SEXCH 305.238 217.280 0.343 3853.18 
INT 7.263 6.130 -2.254 47.861 
CONTROLS GDP 7.428 3.891 4.947 25.882 
INST -0.069 0.750 -1.599 1.790 
FIN 24.448 28.997 0.198 160.124 
RESV 20.125 2.093 11.635 24.699 
GLOBAL ECO 49.420 13.009 21.792 84.685 
SOC 30.229 11.995 10.951 64.751 
POL 56.488 18.483 25.374 90.945 
AGG 42.940 13.940 21.940 70.930 
Source: authors’ computation 
NOTE:  DOL= Dollarization Index; INF = Inflation EXDEP= Exchange rate Depreciation SEXCH: Volatility of 
nominal exchange rate INT= interest rate spread; GDP = GDP per capita INST= average of institutions FIN = 
financial development RESV = foreign reserves ECO = Economic globalization SOC = social globalization and 
POL = political globalization, AGG  is the aggregate of ECO, SOC and POL.Dependent Var: Dependent 
Variable. StdDev: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum.  
 
The results of the baseline estimates are presented in Table 6. Starting with GLOBAL 
variables, economic globalization (denoted by ECO), though positive, does not significantly 
wield any appreciable influence on the level of dollarization in the region. This is startling 
given the mean value of economic globalization on the descriptive statistics table. This can be 
plausibly attributed in part to the process by which foreign currencies and other foreign 
denominated assets are handled within the region. The level of dollarization may tend to 
reduce if emanating transactions from ECO are properly channeled through domestic 
financial systems. This result contradicts that of Raheem and Asongu (2018) whose variable 
of financial integration was positively significant across the estimated models. The emanated 
difference may be said to be due in part, to the indicator used to capture ECO by the authors. 
For instance, previous studies like Kessy (2011), Raheem and Asongu (2018) and Lanes and 
Milesi- Ferratti (2006) have used foreign capital inflow, financial aid and financial integration 
index, respectively to surrogate for economic globalization. It is however, interesting to note 
that both the social and political globalization variables represented by SOC and POL 
constitute the main dollarization amplifiers with the effects of the former featuring more 
prominently than the latter. At least the three “S’s” (i.e. significance, sign and size) on the 
regression estimates are dully satisfied. Apart from being statistically different from zero, 
these indices have the right signs, which support the hypothesis of this study. Moreover, they 
17 
 
also have relatively non-zero coefficients. A similar argument equally holds for the aggregate 
index of globalization16. It is important to mention that the emanating intuition from Table 6 
regarding globalization indices is that the foreign currencies obtainable from both the social 
and political dimensions of globalization are largely unregulated or at best inadvertently 
undermined as constituting formidable threats to socio-economic stability. 
More importantly, with respect to RETURNS, inflation and exchange rate volatility 
constitute the key predictors of dollarization episodes in SSA. For instance, the coefficients 
of inflation ranged between 0.052 and 0.347. These results support the argument of Minimum 
Variance Portfolio (MVP) postulated by Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) that volatility of 
exchange rate and inflation are the prominent determinants of dollarization. On the empirical 
front, studies such as De-Nicole (2005), Yinusa (2009), Vieri et al. (2012) and Raheem and 
Asongu (2018) also obtained similar results. Interest rate spread is a positive determinant but 
rather insignificant. Again, devaluation of exchange rate (i.e. depreciation) increases the 
incidence of dollarization in SSA, which is in tandem with theoretical expositions. However, 
this variable suffers from loss of statistical significance.  
Further, across the models estimated, economic growth serves as a driving 
“dedollarization” force in SSA. The implication is that higher GDP per capita growth tends to 
lower the penchant for holding foreign as against domestic currencies. This is more likely to 
be so as a growing economy tends to have a strong productive base to support its local 
currency. This result aligns with Yinusa (2009) and IMF (2015). The improved institutional 
infrastructure among in SSA could also help in reducing the dollarization trend in the region. 
This mostly works through channels like credibility in government policies, enforcement of 
contract, supervisory role of the monetary authorities, among others. This seems plausible as 
deficiency in these more often than not create room for the substitution of domestic for 
foreign currencies. Honig (2005, 2009), Aizenman et al. (2005), Levy-Yeyati (2006) and 
Doblas-Madrid (2009) are among the previous studies that had earlier obtained similar results. 
With respect to financial sector development, the financial product innovations as well as 
better service delivery can equally help in reducing the use of foreign currencies in the region. 
This contradicts the theoretical argument underlying studies of Honohan and Shi (2002), Asel 
(2010), to name a very few. The coefficients on the variable of international reserves duly 
conform to theoretical prior as dollarization episode tends to be high as reserves soar. This is 
                                            
16
 In Table 6, we chose not to present the result of the aggregated globalization index so as not to crowd the table. 
The result of the aggregated index is similar to that obtained in the case of SOC. However, the result of the 
aggregated index can be made available upon request.  
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also confirmed by Yotopolous (1997).  
On the endogeneity issue, in order to ensure that the previously presented results are 
valid to the control for endogeneity, the use instrumental variable Tobit regression was 
embraced. The results are presented in Table 7. Among the important noticeable differences 
in these results and those presented in Table 6 is the significance of the economic 
globalization at 10 % significance level which is supported by higher magnitude coefficients. 
Also, attempt is made to present the semi-elasticity of the models (with special reference to 
Table 6 only). These results are reported in Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 in Table 6. The last 
robustness check we performed was to test for an outlier effect. In principle, the eliminated 
countries are Namibia, Liberia, the DRC, South Africa and Comoros. The results of these 
tests are presented in Table 8. 
Table 6: TOBIT Results 
Categories  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RETURNS INF 0.347*** 
[0.076] 
0.052** 
[0.025] 
0.158*** 
[0.082] 
0.052** 
[0.024] 
0.274*** 
[0.074] 
0.065** 
[0.021] 
0.247*** 
[0.078] 
0.080*** 
[0.027] 
EXDEP 0.0003 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
[0.004] 
-0.001 
[0.002] 
-0.002 
[0.003] 
-0.002 
[0.003] 
-0.001 
[0.003] 
-0.002 
[0.003] 
-0.004 
[0.006] 
SEXCH 0.007** 
[0.003] 
0.179** 
[0.054] 
0.004 
[0.009] 
0.179** 
[0.054] 
0.005* 
[0.003] 
0.004** 
[0.001] 
0.007* 
[0.004] 
0.046** 
[0.019] 
INT 0.040 
[0.108] 
0.029 
[0.021] 
0.121 
[0.091] 
0.029 
[0.021] 
0.081 
[0.100] 
0.047 
[0.036] 
0.099 
[0.105] 
0.022 
[0.024] 
CONTROLS GDP -1.170*** 
[0.302] 
-
0.314*** 
[0.081] 
-1.250*** 
[0.264] 
-
0.314*** 
[0.081] 
-1.720*** 
[0.211] 
-0.459 
[0.146] 
-1.743*** 
[0.554] 
-
0.498*** 
[0.137] 
INST -4.323** 
[1.881] 
0.002 
[0.002] 
0.248*** 
[0.001] 
0.001*** 
[0.000] 
-7.013*** 
[1.736] 
-0.497 
[0.211] 
-4.565* 
[2.559] 
-0.117 
[0.107] 
FIN -0.1009** 
[0.046] 
-0.029 
[0.035] 
-0.036 
[0.043] 
-0.029 
[0.035] 
-0.205*** 
[0.046] 
-
0.133*** 
[0.021] 
-0.114** 
[0.060] 
-0.114** 
[0.058] 
RESV 1.639*** 
[0.531] 
0.552** 
[0.279] 
0.924** 
[0.450] 
0.552** 
[0.279] 
1.876*** 
[0.476] 
0.562*** 
[0.168] 
1.768*** 
[0.653] 
1.211*** 
[0.395] 
GLOBAL ECO   0.006 
[0.059] 
0.008 
[0.021] 
    
SOC     0.697*** 
[0.110] 
0.016*** 
[0.001] 
  
POL       0.159** 
[0.071] 
0.303** 
[0.126] 
         
DIAGNOSTICS 
 
 
 
 
DIAGNOSTICS 
Sigma_u 17.912***  24.498***  19.233***  22.248***  
Sigma_e 4.637***  3.164***  3.667***  3.841***  
Rho 0.937  0.983  0.965  0.971  
         
Left 
censored 
38  24  38  38  
Uncensored 125  69  74  74  
Right 
censored 
118  128  169  169  
Source: Authors’ Computation  
Note: Values in parenthesis are the standard errors, while “*”, “**”, ”***” represents 10, 5 and 1% level of 
statistical significance, respectively. 
NOTE:  DOL= Dollarization Index; INF = Inflation EXDEP= Exchange rate Depreciation SEXCH: Volatility of 
nominal exchange rate INT= interest rate spread; GDP = GDP per capita INST= average of institutions FIN = 
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financial development RESV = foreign reserves ECO = economic globalization  SOC = social globalization and 
POL = political globalization  AGG is the aggregate of ECO, SOC and POL. 
 
 
Table 7:  Robustness Test with IVTOBIT Results 
Categories Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
RETURNS INF 0.306** 
[0.105] 
0.217** 
[0.056] 
0.150*** 
[0.031] 
0.586*** 
[0.309] 
0.368** 
(0.118) 
EXDEP -0.002 
[0.006] 
-0.001 
[0.002] 
0.001 
[0.006] 
0.001 
[0.006] 
0.002 
(0.002) 
SEXCH 0.006*** 
[0.002] 
0.005** 
[0.002] 
0.002*** 
[0.000] 
0.005** 
[0.003] 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
INT 1.088*** 
[0.299] 
0.864*** 
[0.261] 
0.761*** 
[0.213] 
0.910*** 
[0.312] 
0.793** 
(0.276) 
CONTROLS GDP -1.846*** 
[0.263] 
-1.348*** 
[0.206] 
-1.275*** 
[0.170] 
-2.232*** 
[0.356] 
-2.048*** 
(0.267) 
INST -4.972*** 
[1.693] 
-2.449 
[1.718] 
-6.291*** 
[1.715] 
2.201*** 
[0.454] 
-1.938*** 
(0.445) 
FIN -0.334*** 
[0.049] 
-0.309** 
[0.120] 
-0.461*** 
[0.065] 
-0.642*** 
{0.090} 
-0.293** 
(0.122) 
RESV 4.548*** 
[0.757] 
3.049*** 
[0.684] 
3.466*** 
[0.657] 
3.675** 
[1.131] 
3.904** 
(1.252) 
GLOBAL ECO  0.298* 
[0.173] 
   
SOC   0.845** 
[0.325] 
  
POL    0.123*** 
[0.004] 
 
 AGG     0.493** 
(0.133) 
DIAGNOSTICS  
 
 
 
 
DIAGNOSTICS 
Alpha -0.648 
[0.157] 
-0.162 
[0.047] 
0.253 
[0.182] 
-1.166*** 
[0.3760] 
-2.380*** 
[0.364] 
WALD 0.361 0.773 0.365 0.265 0.428 
CHI2 
(PROB) 
0.045 0.056 0.015 0.002 0.032 
      
Left 
censored 
34 22 22 34 34 
Uncensored 68 63 63 68 68 
Right 
censored 
155 117 117 155 155 
Source: Authors’ Computation  
Note: Values in parenthesis are the standard errors, while “*”, “**”, ”***” represents 10, 5 and 1% level of 
statistical significance, respectively. 
NOTE:  DOL= Dollarization Index; INF = Inflation EXDEP= Exchange rate Depreciation SEXCH: Volatility of 
nominal exchange rate INT= interest rate spread; GDP = GDP per capita INST= average of institutions FIN = 
financial development RESV = foreign reserves ECO = Economic Integration SOC = social Integration and 
POL = political integration AGG is the aggregate of ECO, SOC and POL. 
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Table 8: Robustness Test for Outlier Sub-sample 
Categories Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
RETURNS INF 0.254** 
[0.098] 
0.227** 
[0.102] 
0.323* 
[0.153] 
0.375* 
[0.187] 
0.2118 
[0.054] 
EXDEP -0.004 
[0.006] 
-0.003 
[0.003] 
-0.002 
[0.005] 
-0.003 
[0.005] 
0.004 
[0.005] 
SEXCH 0.007** 
[0.0023 
0.104** 
[0.051] 
0.175** 
[0.055] 
0.211*** 
[0.003] 
0.313*** 
[0.000] 
INT 2.000*** 
[0.354] 
1.294** 
[0.430] 
1.459** 
[0.656] 
1.459*** 
[0.321] 
0.949** 
[0.] 
CONTROLS GDP -0.655** 
[0.222] 
-0.854*** 
[0.103] 
-1.043** 
[0.456] 
-1.144*** 
[0.333] 
-1.987** 
[0.590] 
INST -1.938*** 
[0.028] 
-2.293*** 
[0.094] 
-3.904** 
[1.148] 
-1.994*** 
[0.087] 
-2.049** 
[0.974] 
FIN -0.294** 
[0.087] 
-0.639*** 
[0.103] 
-0.392*** 
[0.069] 
-0.403*** 
{0.052} 
-0.193** 
(0.048) 
RESV 1.237*** 
[0.187] 
2.934*** 
[0.720] 
3.048*** 
[0.938] 
3.048** 
[0.903] 
2.894** 
(0.830) 
GLOBAL ECO  0.200* 
[0.102] 
   
SOC   0.673** 
[0.193] 
  
POL    0.382*** 
[0.092] 
 
 AGG     0.666** 
(0.293) 
DIAGNOSTICS  
DIAGNOSTICS Alpha -0.538** 
[0.157] 
-0.404*** 
[0.047] 
0.222 
[0.329] 
-1.188*** 
[0.367] 
-1.392*** 
[0.283] 
WALD 0.638 0.393 0.230 0.495 0.526 
CHI2 
(PROB) 
0.033 0.043 0.028 0.028 0.044 
      
Left 
censored 
34 22 22 34 34 
Uncensored 68 63 63 68 68 
Right 
censored 
155 117 117 155 155 
Source: Authors’ Computation  
 
Note: Values in parenthesis are the standard errors, while “*”, “**”, ”***” represents 10, 5 and 1% level of 
statistical significance, respectively. 
NOTE:  DOL= Dollarization Index; INF = Inflation EXDEP= Exchange rate Depreciation SEXCH: Volatility of 
nominal exchange rate INT= interest rate spread; GDP = GDP per capita INST= average of institutions FIN = 
financial development RESV = foreign reserves ECO = Economic globalization ,  SOC = social globalization 
and POL = political globalization  AGG is the aggregate of ECO, SOC and POL. 
 
 
6.0 Concluding implications and future research directions 
This study contributes to the dollarization literature by expanding its determinants to account 
for different dimensions of globalization. Thus, three measures of globalization (economic, 
political and social) are introduced into a financial dollarization model. Abundant empirics 
from previous studies have mainly focused on the economic component using other measures 
such as FDI, foreign aid and a financial integration index as key surrogate variables (Corrales 
et al. 2016; Kessy, 2011). The spatial and temporal scopes are limited respectively to 25sub-
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Saharan African (SSA) countries and the period 2001 through 2012. 
Using instrumental variable Tobit regression, the following results have been 
established. (i) With respect to globalization factors, both the social and political dimensions 
of globalization affect dollarization, while the influence of the economic component is weak. 
(ii)Macroeconomic instabilities involving inflation and exchange rate volatility variables 
have also been lent credence. Furthermore, the theoretical conjecture underlying minimum 
variance portfolio argument has been dully upheld for the duo. (iii) The deleterious impacts 
of international reserves have equally been noticed. (iv) The results are robust to semi-
elasticity estimation, outlier tests and the control for simultaneity. 
In the light of the above outcomes, the following are some implications for policy. 
First, special attention should henceforth be accorded to every dimension of globalization, 
particularly its social and political components. This becomes imperative as illicit foreign 
currencies and other foreign related transactions as well as other sharp practices have been 
observed to have gained unnoticed influence into the region. This can be curtailed henceforth 
provided appropriate sanctions are meted out to defaulters. Second, the macroeconomic 
environment should be constantly maintained, mostly with respect to inflation and exchange 
rate volatilities. Third, the interest rate spread should be kept within the range of bounds such 
that whenever the threshold is exceeded, inbuilt mechanisms should work to restore it back to 
normalcy. Lastly, deeper financial systems supported by quality institutional frameworks 
should be further strengthened in the region. 
Future studies can investigate if the established findings withstand empirical scrutiny 
within country-specific settings in order to derive more targeted policy implications. 
Moreover, accounting for heterogeneities that are exogenous to financial dollarization is 
worthwhile.  
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Appendix 
A: List of Countries  
Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao 
Tome and Principle, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. 
B: Data Description 
Variable Definition Measurement Source 
Dollarization Foreign currency deposit as a 
ratio of broad money supply 
% International 
Monetary Fund 
(IMF) 
Interest Rate 
Differentials 
Interest rate differentials 
between domestic and foreign 
economies17 
% World Development 
Indicator (WDI) 
Inflation Logarithm of Consumer Price 
Index 
% WDI 
Exchange Rate 
Volatility 
Standard deviation of the 
exchange rate. Exchange rate is 
defined as the number of units of 
local currency that could 
exchange for one unit of 
American Dollar, based on 
official (forex) rate. 
Level WDI 
Exchange rate 
depreciation 
The depreciation of the local 
currency against the American 
dollar, on a yearly basis. 
Level  Authors’ calculation 
with underlining data  
from WDI 
Globalization indices See footnote 13 Level KOF index 
Institutional/governance 
index 
See footnote 14 Level World Governance 
Index 
Financial Development Credit provided to the Private 
Sector 
% of GDP WDI 
GDP per capita growth Growth rate of the GDP per 
capital 
% WDI 
International Reserve The ratio of the level of 
international reserves to GDP 
% WDI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
17Interest rate of the United States of America is used as a proxy for foreign economies, which is in line with the 
extant literature. 
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